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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOUTH KAMAS IRRIGATION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appelloot,
Case
No. 9168

-Vs.PROVO RIVER WATER USERS'
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Respondent.

APP·ELLANT'S. BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
The Duchesne Tunnel conveys water from the Duchesne River to the Provo River. Appellant has an approved water filing to divert and beneficially use water
from Little Deer Creek, and such water can be used most
economically by bringing it through the Duchesne Tunnel.
Respondent Provo River Water Users' Association, a
mutual water corporation, operates and controls the
Duchesne Tunnel pursuant to a contract with the United
States Bureau of Reclamation. Appellant, also a mutual
water corporation, owns shares of stock in Respondent
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corporation and brought this action for a declaratory
judgment, requesting the court to declare that appellant,
as a stockholder in respondent mutual water corporation,
has the right in common with other stockholders of the
corporation to use all water conveyancing facilities which
respondent corporation has the right to use.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
No evidence was introduced in the court below. The
facts recited in this brief, therefore, do not appear in the
record, except as allegations in the complaint or admissions in the Motion. Also, some reference is made to the
public records in the office of the State Engineer, since
this Court takes judicial notice of those records.
Appellant, a mutual water corporation, owns shares
of stock in respondent Provo River Water Users' Association, also a mutual water corporation. Appellant has
a water right, independent of its shares of stock in respondent, for 25 c.f.s. of water from Little Deer Creek.
This water can be used most economically if the water is
brought through the Duchesne Tunnel and connected
facilities which were constructed as part of the Deer
Creek Division of the Provo River Project, and financed
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (See Contract attached to Motion). Legal title to these facilities
was retained by the United States, but the operation has
been turned over to respondent, and the facilities are
operated and controlled for the benefit of the stockholders
of respondent (Contract attached to Motion).
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The water to which appellant has a right by its Application No. 16063 has for several years been captured and
used by respondent. Thus, when appellant requested use
of the Duchesne Tunnel for conveying the water abovementioned, respondent refused to permit such use
(Complaint). Further, the Bureau of Reclamation has
attempted to obtain the water for which appellant has
an approved application, and has made a junior filing,
not yet approved (Application No. 30389, Misc. Book
16, page 481). The file in the State Engineer's office on
this junior application reveals that the Bureau has made
repeated efforts to induce the State Engineer to lapse
appellant's approved application and to approve the
Bureau's junior application. Though this evidence was
not introduced below in documentary form, it was brought
out in oral argument in response to questions from the
court, and, in any event, it is well settled in Utah that this
Court will take judicial notice of the records in the office
of the State Engineer:
"Since the records of the State Engineer's Office
are public records, we take judicial notice thereof." McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442,
447 (1948).
Thus, the Bureau seeks a water right through its
unapproved, junior filing on the very water for which
appellant has an approved application. If the Bureau is
successful, the use and benefit of the water will go, as
it now does, to respondent Association, just as does all
Project water (Contract attached to Motion).
3
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Appellant :filed this action for a declaratory judgment, requesting the court to adjudge that appellant, as
a stockholder in respondent mutual water corporation, has
the right in common with other stockholders of the corporation to use all water conveyancing facilities which
respondent mutual corporation has the right to use.
Appellant did not seek and does not now seek to have the
court construe respondent's contract with the Bureau of
Reclamation. The relief sought is limited entirely to a
declaration that appellant, as a stockholder of respondent company, has the right in common with other stockholders to use all water conveyancing facilities of
respondent company (whatever they are).
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in the court below, and in support thereof argued that since respondent's right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and all related
facilities are governed by a contract between the United
States and respondent Provo River Water Users' Association, the instant suit for a declaratory judgment would
necessarily require the court to construe that .contract.
Therefore, argued respondent, the United States is an
indispensable party to the instant action, and since it cannot be sued without its consent, and since it has not given
its consent to the instant suit, the action must be dismissed. Accordingly, the lower court dismissed appellant's complaint, and from that judgment of dismissal
appellant has brought this appeal.

4
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, AND IN
DISMISSING THE ACTION.
(a) Appellant's Complaint Does Not Require Adjudication of Any Issues in Which the United
States Has an Interest.
The law relating to indispensable parties is not complex, nor do we believe it is in dispute in the instant litigation. We readily concede that if in this action we were
trying to interpret respondent's contract with the Bureau
of Reclamation, the United States would be an indispensable party, and the trial court could have properly
dismissed the complaint. But we do not seek to have the
contract construed. One need only examine appellant's
complaint to determine the relief prayed for - we seek
only to have the court declare our rights as a stockholder
of respondent Association.
It is believed there will be no difficulty in applying
the law. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
the applicable rule dealing with necessary joinder of
parties. Though we have stated that we think the law is
not in serious dispute, we will, prelirninarily, set forth the
policy and purpose of the law in recognizing indispensable parties, and in distinguishing them from conditionally necessary, proper and formal parties.
A formal party is not a real party in interest but
must be made a plaintiff or a defendant as a matter of
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procedure, as the guardian where the real plaintiff is
an infant (see, e.g., Moore's Federal Pra.ctice, Volume 3,
page 2104). A proper party is one who has an interest
in the litigation and who may join as plaintiff or be joined
as defendant "because there is a question of law or fact
common to the right or duty in which he is interested and
another right sought to be enforced in the action and the
rights or liabilities involved arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.''
(Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 3, page 2104).
Rule 19 does not deal with formal or proper parties,
but deals with compulsory joinder of parties, i.e., those
parties whose presence before the court is either indispensable or conditionally necessary. Conditionally necessary parties are those persons having a joint interest
and who must be joined as parties if they are subject to
the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process
and venue and can be made parties without depriving
the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it. But if
the joinder would deprive the court of its jurisdiction of
the parties before it, or if the court's jurisdiction over
them can only be acquired by their consent or voluntary
appearance, the court will proceed to render judgment,
but the judgment rendered will not affect the rights or
liabilities of absent persons (Rule 19 (b) ) . An indispensable party is one who has a joint interest in the subject
of the litigation, and must be joined as a party or the
action will be dismissed (Moore, op. cit., supra, at 2104).
The lower court ruled that in the instant action the
United States was an indispensable party, thereby con6
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eluding that the United States had a joint interest in the
relief prayed for in appellant's complaint. In so ruling
the court erroneously construed appellant's complaint
as a request for a declaratory judgment adjudicating the
(lXtent of respondent's right to use the Duchesne Tunnel
and connected facilities under the contract between
respondent and the United States. Appellant's complaint did not request such an adjudication. In order to
understand the nature of the instant action it is necessary
to identify two separate questions related to appellant's
claim that it has a right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and
connected facilities:
1. Does appellant, as a stockholder in respondent mutual water corporation, have a right
to use in common with other stockholders of respondent whatever rights respondent has to use
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities; and
2. What rights, if any, does respondent
Provo River Water Users' Association have to use
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities~
The first question is the only one with which the
instant action is concerned. Admittedly, an answer to the
second question might require, among other things, a
construction of the meaning of the contract between respondent and the United States. But appellant does not
seek an answer to that question in this action.
As we have observed, the lower court erroneously
construed appellant's complaint as requiring an adjudication of both of the above questions. But it does not.

7
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The prayer is limited to a determination of appellant's
rights as a stockholder in a mutual water corporation.
The judgment on that question wo-uld not concern or
interest the United States in any manner. In order to
frame a controversy justifying a declaratory judgment,
appellant did recite in the complaint that respondent had
a contractual right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and other
facilities by virtue of its contract with the United States.
Appellant did not ask the court to define, declare or adjudicate the nature or the extent of that right. It is not denied that respondent has some right - and we seek only
to have the court declare that respondent cannot exclude
appellant from using such rights as respondent has
(whatever they 'are). In other words, appellant alleged
that it had a right as a stockholder in a mutual company
which respondent company refused to recognize, and
asked the court to declare the rights of a stockholder in a
mutual water corporation. The prayer of appellant's complaint requests. only:
"that the court adjudicate, declare and determine
that plaintiff is entitled, as a stockholder in defendant mutual water corporation, to use and employ in
common with other stockholders of defendant all
of the .rights of defendant connected with the use
of the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities
so long as such use does not interfere with any
other reasonable or necessary uses by defendant
or its other stockholders.''·
We emphasize that appellant's complaint recited that
respondent had a contractual right to use the facilities
in question purely for the purpose of framing the need
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for a declaratory judgment. There was no prayer for
a construction of the contract between respondent and
the United States.

It is submitted, then, that the United States has no
joint interest, nor any interest, in the present litigation.
The instant lawsuit is purely one between the stockholder
and the corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment
as to th,e rights of a stockholder in a mutual water corporation. In fact, the United States could not even qualify for permissive joinder as a proper party, since there
is not even a question of law or fact common to a· right
or duty in which the United States is interested. Perhaps if we would have .added a second count to our complaint asking the court to consider the meaning of the
contract with the Bureau, then the United States would
have been interested - but we did 'not raise this issue.
The only possible interest the United States could have
relates to its rights and duties under its contract with respondent Association, and that contrac~ ~ill not be construed as part of the present litigation.
The issue on appeal is simply one of analyzing plaintiff's complaint. to determine what in fact app~llant has
prayed for. The v~lidity of the analysis presented above
is obvious from an examination of the face of the complaint. Nevertheless,' the lower court has erroneously held
that the United States is an indispensable party. Probably it is this matter, and not the law, which divides the
parties. If the contract with the Bureau must be construed in order for the court to declare that a stockholder
9
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in a mutual company has the right to use facilities and
rights of the mutual company, then we concede that the
United States is an indispensable party. But if it is possible to declare what a stockholder's rights are under
the Articles of Incorporation and under the law of mutual
irrigation companies, without also construing the purchase contract, then the court is wrong. Therefore, we will
briefly set forth the criteria for determining who are
indispensable parties, and the policy considerations which
should guide the court.
There are no clear-cut rules which can be applied
in every case to distinguish indispensable parties from
necessary parties, but the determination is made on the
facts of the particular case, guided by certain basic principles. The landmark case in this area of the law, Shields
v. Barrow, 17 How 130 (1854), is discussed by Professor
Moore as follows :
''In spite of the vast number of cases that have
arisen concerning who are necessary and who are
indispensable parties, the governing principles
have remained comparatively simple and constant.
Most often cited for these principles is the case of
Shields v. Barrow, in which Mr. Justice Curtis
said, 'persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order
that the court may act on that rule which requires
it to decide on, and finally determine rights in it
. . . are commonly termed necessary parties ; but
if their interests are separable from those of the
parties before the court so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice,
without affecting other persons, not before the
court, the latter are not indispensable parties.
10
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Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a
final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such
a condition that its final termination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and in good conscience'
are indispensable parties.'' Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 3, Page 2150 (emphasis added).
There are two counter-balancing policies of equal
importance which serve as guides in distinguishing between indispensable and necessary parties. One is the
desire to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and to bring all
interested parties before the court so that a final judgment can be entered which will be binding on all the
parties; the counter-balancing policy is the desire to have
some adjudication rather than none, and when the parties
otherwise would be left remediless, the court will strain
hard to permit some adjudication. This is illustrated by
Professor Moore, who in turn cites Mr. Justice Sutherland speaking for the United States Supreme Court:
"In spite of the simplicity of the principles, however, their application to cases in which it is essential to distinguish between necessary and indispensable parties, bears out the statement made by the
Supreme Court that 'there is no prescribed formula for determining in every case whether a person
or corporation is an indispensable party or not.'
On the one hand is the desirability of preventing
a multiplicity of suits, and that there might be a
complete and final decree between all parties interested. Opposed to this is the desirability of having
some adjudication, if at all possible, rather than
none, that leaves the parties remediless due to an
ideaL desire to have all interested persons before
11
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the court. This thought was well expressed by Mr.
Justice Sutherland in Bourdieu v. Pacific Western
Oil Co. as follows:
'The rUle, is that. if the merits of the cause may
be. determined without prejudice to the rights
of necessary partie~, absent and beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, it will be done ; and
a court of equity will strain hard to reach that
· result. (citing cases)
'We refer to the rule established by these authorities because it' illustrates the diligence
with which ·courts of equity will seek a way
to adjudicate the merits of a case in the abs'ence of . interested patties that cannot be
brought in.' ''. Moore '.s Federal Practice, Vol:ume 3, Page 2154. .
The.la,w relati.ng to in9.ispensa,ble and necessary P.arties is the

sa~e

in actions for. declaratory judgments as

in other actions :
. ''The general theory a~ .to who are ind,ispensable
and ne.cessary parties applies to suits for declaratory judgments. Obviously, an indispensable party
must be joined -in a declaratory judgment action,
just as in gny other, since· the court could not proceed to enter an equitable judgment in the absence
of such party. But we ha.ve called attention to the
desirability o.f riot expanding the concept of indispensable pa;rties to the point that parties, having
.rights· warrarnting adjudication, are left remediless, if. it is at all possible to proceed with the
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parties before the court, and that' a court of equity
will strain hard to rea.ch that result.' As a result of
this, and due to the flexibility of the declaratory
judgment procedure there may be times when the
court will be able to proceed, without prejudicing
the rights of absent persons, when it would be difficult to do so under a more rigid procedure. On
the other hand a declaratorly judgment action
must serve a useful purpose, mainly in affording
a remedy for rights or duties warranting adjudication, which could not be presented at all or only
imperfectly under the older and traditional forms
of procedure.'' Moore's Federal Practice, Volume
3, Page 2197 (emphasis added).
The Utah law is in harmony with the principles just
cited. The Utah Supreme Court has said that:
''Whenever a party has been omitted whose presence is so indispensable to a decision of the case
upon its merits that a final decree cannot be made
without materially affecting his interests, the court
should not proceed to a decision of the case upon
the merits." Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co.,
76 P. 2d 234.
But that:
'' ... it is not the uniform, unvarying practice to
join as a party plaintiff or defendant every party
having an interest in the subject matter or in
granting or opposing the relief sought. There is
the distinction between proper and necessary or
indispensable parties. Thus, in actions to quiet
title the plaintiff may join all or as many persons
claiming adversely as he chooses and make them
parties defendant. And the judgment will settle
matters only as between those actually joined and
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served with process. In creditors' suits and in numerous other actions by stockholders, creditors,
heirs, or others, the plaintiff may join all or as
many as he deems necessary or judicious in view
of the nature of the relief he seeks and the ends
in view. It is not always essential to jurisdiction
that every party in interest be joined on the record
at the outset.'' McCarthy et al v. Public Service
Commission of Utah et al, 77 P. 2d 331.
In summary, we think it is clear that the United
States has no legitimate interest in an adjudication limited to the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. If the complaint required a construction of the contract between
respondent and the United States, in order to determine
what rights respondent has against the United States,
then the United States clearly would be an interested
party, and, perhaps, an indispensable party. But the
complaint does not request a construction of that contract,
nor does it require the adjudication of any question in
which the United States has an interest.
If the present action is adjudicated on the merits
in favor of appellant, and if respondent then refuses to
permit appellant to use the facilities in question, claiming
that it (respondent) does not have any right to use such
facilities, appellant might then be required to bring a
stockholder's derivative suit in the name of the corporation against the United States in the federal district court
or in the court of claims. In such an action the United
States could not plead its immunity from suit because the
action would be on a contract to which the United States
was a party and prosecuted in the name of the other
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contracting party. But the contingency of such a future
lawsuit in the federal court in order to bring ultimate
relief to appellant is quite immaterial on this appeal,
except to show that the present action requires only an
adjudication of rights between appellant and respondent,
and to show that such present adjudication would serve
a useful and necessary purpose as a foundation for a
second lawsuit, if necessary, to bring appellant ultimate
relief.
We wish to emphasize that it is only after determining that a party has an interest in a lawsuit that the court
determines if such party is necessary or indispensable.
Under the prayer of appellant's complaint, it is clear that
the United States has no interest in the present litigation, and the distinction between necessary and indispensable parties is moot. But if this Court should determine that the United States has an interest in the instant
lawsuit, the declaratory judgment prayed for by appellant can be granted without prejudice to the United
States, and, since appellant would otherwise be remediless, the court will strain hard to permit some adjudication by designating the United States a conditionally
necessary party, rather than an indispensable party.
(b) If the Present Action Is Dismissed, Appellant
Will Never Have Its Day in Court.
The most fundamental concept in Anglo-American
jurisprudence is that every person should be entitled to
his day in court. A system of law which does not provide
a procedure to permit a party to have his rights deter-
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mined upon their merits seems wholly foreign to the concept of justice as we know it. Yet, if this Court sustains
the holding of the lower court, appellant will never have
its day in court and, as a result thereof, will probably lose
a valuable water right.
The background facts· g1v1ng nse to the instant
iitigation are illuminating, and were brought to the attention of the lower court in response to questions· from
the court.
The United States financed the· Deer Creek Division
of the Provo River Project, pursuant to the contract
mentioned earlier. Legal title to the water rights, storage works and conveyancing facilities is in the United
States,; but the control and management has been turned
over to respondent Provo River Water Users' Association, and the system is operated for the use and benefit
of the stockholders of respondent .Association (Contract
attached to Motion).
As recited in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff's water
right discussed in this litigation is an approved application for 25 c.f.s. from Little Deer Creek (Application No.
16063). At the present time, that water is not being used
by appellant because appellant has no facilities to carry
the water from Little Deer Creek to its diverting canals.
But the water can be and is being captured by the Project
facilities mentioned. Hence, the water in question is
16
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being taken and used each year by respondent Association. Further, the United States has a junior filing on
the same water, and is seeking approval of that application from the State Engineer (Application No. 30389).
These filings in the State Engineer's Office, under the
case of McGarry v. Thompson, sup·ra, are judicially noticed by this Court. If appellant is prevented from litigating its right to use whatever facilities respondent
Association has a right to use, and cannot otherwise use
its water right, then the State Engineer ultimately will
lapse appellant's application and approve the United
States' junior application, and the use and benefit of the
water will continue to go to respondent Association. It
is thus clear that both the United States and the Provo
River Water Users' Association will benefit if appellant
is prevented from perfecting its use of the water.
The "cooperation" between the United States and
respondent Association is well illustrated by the present
litigation. Respondent Association defends on the ground
that the United States is an Indispensable Party and,
therefore, there can be no adjudication upon the merits.
The United States refuses to enter the litigation, enjoying
its immunity from the present litigation.
If appellant had attempted to bring a stockholder's
derivative suit in the federal court against the United
States for breach of contract or to construe the contract
between the United States and the Association, the Association most certainly would have entered the litigation,
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claiming that preliminarily it must be determined that a
stockholder can enjoy the same rights as the mutual corporation. Thus, it would be asserted that such issue could
not be adjudicated upon the merits because the Association would be an indispensable party and if it were joined
as a defendant there would be no diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction in the federal court between appellant and
respondent Association to permit adjudication of the
preliminary question. And so would go the merry-goround.
Thus, appellant determined that the only procedure
whereby its rights could be adjudicated would be to bring
two successive (not alternative) lawsuits. First, a declaratory judgment action in the state court to declare
that a stockholder in a mutual water corporation is entitled to use in common with the other stockholders all
water conveyancing and storage facilities which the corporation has a right to use. Second, if necessary, a stockholder's derivative suit against the United States based
upon the contract between the United States and respondent Association; establishing the Association's rights to
use the facilities in question. Appellant might elect to
bring an action for damages against the United States
in the Court of Claims (Title 18, § 1491, U.S.C.A.) or

in the Federal district court (Title 18, § 1346, U.S.C.A.),
~nd

any claim for damages as a result of the United

.States' refusal to deliver water pursuant to the. contract
would necessarily involve a construction of the meaning
of the contract
18
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Appellant's route to a legal remedy might seem
somewhat arduous and circuituous, but it is the only possible remedy. And, such a circuituous route, if circuituous
it be, is made necessary by the conduct of the United
States and respondent Association.
We do not seek to discredit either the United States
or respondent Association in their desire to obtain the
valuable water right owned by appellant. We do seek
to discredit the method by which they hope to accomplish
the result. Rather than litigate the merits to determine
what the respective rights of the parties are, they seek
to avoid any determination of the merits in the hope that
appellant will not find a means of conveying and using
the water and that the State Engineer will lapse appellant's approved application and approve the United
States' junior application.
SUMMARY
The only point raised on this appeal is whether the
United States is an indispensable party to the present
action. In asserting that it is not, we have presented the
following arguments :
(a) Appellant's complaint only requests an adjudication of rights as between appellant and
respondent. The United States is not even an
interested party in the instant litigation, much
less an indispensable party ;
(b) Even if the United States could be viewed as
having an interest in the instant litigation,
the law is clear to the effect that, when the
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plaintiff would otherwise be remediless, the
court will strain hard to consider the interested party to be only a necessary party, and
not an indispensable party, so that some adjudication can be had;
(c) The rights of appellant and respondent can
be adjudicated without in any way binding or
adjudicating the rights of the United States
under its contract with respondent;
(d) If appellant's present action is dismissed, it
will never have its day in court, will never
have its rights adjudicated upon their merits,
and as a result thereof, will probably lose a
valuable water right.
It is respectfully urged that the United States is not
an indispensable party to the present proceeding, and that
the trial court erred in holding otherwise.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE,
Attorney for Appellant

20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

